Slide to Unlock: Apple-Samsung, Alice, and the Need for Clarity in Assessing Patent-Eligibility Under Section 101 for Touchscreen Software Patents by McKinley, Tucker J.
Journal of Intellectual Property Law
Volume 22 | Issue 2 Article 6
January 2015
Slide to Unlock: Apple-Samsung, Alice, and the
Need for Clarity in Assessing Patent-Eligibility
Under Section 101 for Touchscreen Software
Patents
Tucker J. McKinley
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Intellectual
Property Law by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Georgia Law. Please share how you have benefited from this access For more
information, please contact tstriepe@uga.edu.
Recommended Citation
Tucker J. McKinley, Slide to Unlock: Apple-Samsung, Alice, and the Need for Clarity in Assessing Patent-Eligibility Under Section 101 for
Touchscreen Software Patents, 22 J. Intell. Prop. L. 411 (2015).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol22/iss2/6
  
411 
SLIDE TO UNLOCK: APPLE-SAMSUNG, ALICE, 
AND THE NEED FOR CLARITY IN ASSESSING 
PATENT-ELIGIBILITY UNDER SECTION 101 FOR 
TOUCHSCREEN SOFTWARE PATENTS 
Tucker J. McKinley* 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 412 
II. BACKGROUND ............................................................................................. 415 
A. HISTORY OF SECTION 101 AND THE PATENTABLE SUBJECT 
MATTER REQUIREMENT ..................................................................... 416 
B. ALICE CORP. V. CLS BANK .................................................................. 419 
C. A BRIEF BACKGROUND OF THE APPLE V. SAMSUNG 
LITIGATION .......................................................................................... 421 
III.  ANALYSIS ........................................................................................................... 424 
A.  THE METHOD CLAIMED IN THE ’721 PATENT REPRESENTS AN 
ABSTRACT IDEA .................................................................................... 424 
B.  THE “SLIDE-TO-UNLOCK” PATENT DOES NOT CONTAIN A 
SUFFICIENTLY “INVENTIVE CONCEPT” TO WARRANT 
PATENT ELIGIBILITY UNDER SECTION 101 .................................... 427 
C. A WORKABLE JUDICIAL TEST TO ANALYZE SECTION 101 
CLAIMS OF TOUCHSCREEN SOFTWARE PATENTS ........................... 430 
IV. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................... 432 
                                                                                                                   
 *  J.D. Candidate 2016, University of Georgia School of Law.  The author would like to thank 
Professor Christian Turner and the Editorial Board of the Journal of Intellectual Property Law for 
their suggestions and edits. 
1
McKinley: Slide to Unlock: Apple-Samsung, Alice, and the Need for Clarity i
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 2015
412 J. INTELL. PROP. L.  [Vol. 22:411 
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Over the last ten years, cell phone ownership in the United States has 
skyrocketed.1  Inherent in this fact is the equally dramatic rise in the ownership 
of smartphones.2  The effects of smartphones on modern society are wide 
ranging—socially, economically, and legally.  Of particular interest for this 
Note, however, is the technology incorporated in one of the modern 
smartphone’s most common features—the touchscreen and its associated 
software3—and how patent law protects it.  
Long a staple of science fiction, touchscreen technology has existed in some 
form since the 1960s.  The first phone to make use of touchscreen technology 
was the IBM Simon—sometimes considered the world’s first smartphone.4  
The Simon incorporated software and technology now commonplace on 
today’s phones—e-mail, calculator, etc.5  
The Simon, along with subsequent innovations in touchscreen technology, 
paved the way towards the modern smartphone—most notably Apple’s iPhone 
and other smartphones running the Android operating system.  Both 
smartphones prominently feature a touchscreen based interface, where the 
software users almost exclusively operate the device by touching the screen with 
their fingers.  As most current readers are well aware, Apple and Android based 
phones have battled for supremacy in the smartphone market.6  
                                                                                                                   
 1 According to one survey, cell phone ownership among adults in the United States surpassed 
91% in May, 2013.  Up from 65% in November, 2004, “the cell phone is the most quickly 
adopted consumer technology in the history of the world.”  Lee Rainee, Cell Phone Ownership Hits 
91%, FACTTANK, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/06/06/cell-phone-ownership-hi 
ts-91-of-adults/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2015). 
 2 Fifty-eight percent of adults now own a smartphone.  Cell Phone and Smartphone Ownership 
Demographics, FACTTANK, http://www.pewinternet.org/data-trend/mobile/cell-phone-and-smar 
tphone-ownership-demographics/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2015).  
 3 Nearly every current smartphone integrates a touchscreen into the device.  For example, the 
thirty-four smartphones available for sale by carrier Verizon Wireless all incorporate the 
touchscreen, either as the sole means of controlling the device or in conjunction with a keyboard.  
Smartphones, VERIZON WIRELESS, http://www.verizonwireless.com/b2c/device/smartphone?&z 
ipRdr=y (last visited Mar. 14, 2015). 
 4 Before iPhone and Android Came Simon, the First Smartphone, BLOOMBERG BUS., http://www. 
bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2012-06-29/before-iphone-and-android-came-simon-the-first-smart 
phone (last visited Mar. 14, 2015). 
 5 Id. 
 6 In the U.S., Android controls the smartphone market with a 52.1% market share.  Apple is a 
close second with a 41.3% share of the market.  comScore Reports May 2014 U.S. Smartphone 
Subscriber Market Share, COMSCORE, https://www.comscore.com/Insights/Market-Rankings/com 
Score-Reports-May-2014-U.S.-Smartphone-Subscriber-Market-Share (last visited Mar. 14, 2015). 
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Unsurprisingly, this battle has spread from the market to the courtroom.  
Both Apple and Samsung—the largest supplier of Android based 
smartphones—hold valuable patents protecting the technology utilized by their 
phones.7  At issue for this Note are those patents pertaining to the software for 
implementing the touchscreen.  In particular, this Note will focus on the patent 
eligibility of Apple’s “Slide-to-Unlock” patent.8 
The subject of the “Slide-to-Unlock” patent is familiar to any user of an 
iPhone, iPad, or other touchscreen based device designed by Apple.  When a 
user wishes to unlock a phone for use, he or she simply drags an image across 
the screen of the device.9  This concept—or similar implementations—are now 
commonplace on touchscreen devices.10  What many users may not know 
however, is that the patent behind this idea is at the center of a hundred million 
dollar verdict.11 
Since 2011, Apple and Samsung have been engaged in contentions litigation 
over a number of patent disputes.12  The first round of litigation in the United 
States13 resulted in a jury verdict in Apple’s favor with damages totaling over $1 
billion.14  
The “Slide-to-Unlock” patent became the subject of dispute in the second 
infringement suit filed by Apple in 2012.15  Apple alleged infringement of eight 
                                                                                                                   
 7 See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,292,179 (Samsung patent for a software keyboard system on a 
touch screen); see also U.S. Patent No. 7,479,949 (Apple patent for determining commands on a 
touchscreen device). 
 8 Apple has actually had three different versions of the Slide-to-Unlock patent: U.S. Patent 
No. 7,657,849 (filed Dec. 23, 2005), U.S. Patent No. 8,046,721 (filed Sept. 24, 2009) [hereinafter 
The ’721 Patent], and most recently, U.S. Patent No. 8,286,103 (filed Oct. 9, 2012).  The ’721 
Patent is at the core of the Apple-Samsung dispute discussed in this Note, and any reference to 
the “Slide-to-Unlock” will refer to the ’721 Patent. 
 9 See id. 
 10 See How Do I Lock and Unlock My Device?, SAMSUNG, http://www.samsung.com/us/support/ 
howtoguide/n0000013/11957/13085. 
 11 See Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., 2014 WL 1813937 (N.D. Cal.) (explaining the 
swipe method on Samsung phones). 
 12 See id. 
 13 Controversy over the Slide-to-Unlock patent has extended to several other countries.  Not 
all countries have upheld the validity of the patent, but often for different reasons not discussed 
in this Note.  For example, a German court found the patent invalid for lacking innovation.  See 
German Court Says Nein to Apple’s Slide-to-Unlock Patent, THE REGISTER, http://www.theregister.co. 
uk/2013/04/08/apple_slide_unlock_invalid_germany/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2014). 
 14 Nick Wingfield, Jury Awards $1 Billion to Apple in Samsung Patent Case, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/25/technology/jury-reaches-decision-in-apple-samsu 
ng-patent-trial.html. 
 15  See Amended Complaint for Patent Infringement at 4.5 Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elec. Co., 
877 F. Supp. 2d 838 (N.D. Cal. 2012) [hereinafter Amended Complaint]. 
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of its patents, the ’721 (Slide-to-Unlock) patent among them.16  In its defense, 
Samsung had tried and failed on several occasions to invalidate the ’721 
patent.17  Critically, however—as this Note will later discuss—Samsung never 
raised a Section 10118 challenge to the “Slide-to-Unlock” patent.19  In early 
2014, the jury returned a verdict in Apple’s favor, finding Samsung had 
infringed several of Apple’s patents and awarded Apple $120 million.20  
Not long after the jury verdict against Samsung, the Supreme Court 
announced its decision in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank,21 a patent dispute concerning 
the Patent Act’s subject matter requirement.22  In Alice, the Court invalidated a 
software patent for exchanging financial obligations as ineligible subject matter 
under Section 101.23  Unfortunately for Samsung, this decision came too late to 
have a meaningful effect on its litigation with Apple.24 
Despite several recent rulings on what constitutes patentable subject matter, 
culminating in Alice, the contours of the Court’s Section 101 jurisprudence—
particularly as it pertains to “process[es]” (including software processes)—
remain unclear.25  The Court’s failure to clearly establish the limits of patentable 
subject matter creates problems for all involved in the patent process—
                                                                                                                   
 16 Id.   
 17 See Order Denying Samsung’s Motion for Judgment of Invalidity Under 35 U.S.C. § 101 at 2, 
Apple v. Samsung, 877 F. Supp. 2d 838 (N.D. Cal. 2012) [hereinafter Order Denying Samsung’s 
Motion].  
 18 Section 101 states, “[w]hoever, invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain 
a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”  35 U.S.C. 101 (2012).  
Although often neglected in patent invalidity attacks, section 101 challenges have gained both 
prevalence and notoriety in recent years.  See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010); Mayo 
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012); Assoc. for  Molecular 
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). 
 19 See Order Denying Samsung’s Motion supra note 17. 
 20 Don Levine, U.S. jury orders Samsung to pay Apple $120 Million, REUTERS, http://www.reuters. 
com/article/2014/05/03/us-apple-samsung-elec-idUSBREA410Z020140503 (last visited Sept. 
25, 2014).  
 21 134 S. Ct. 2347 (June 19, 2014). 
 22 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
 23 134 S. Ct. 2347. 
 24 See Joe Mullan, Supreme Court Ruling Won’t Kill Apple’s Slide-to-Unlock Patent, ARS TECHNICA, 
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/08/supreme-court-ruling-wont-kill-apples-slide-to-unl 
ock-patent/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2014) (“Samsung won’t get a last minute Alice reprieve . . . [it] 
didn’t raise any defenses from the area of parent law that Alice relates to, section 101, and it can’t 
do so now.”). 
 25 See Patent-Eligible Subject Matter, 124 HARV. L. REV. 370 (2010) (“Of the four categories of 
patent-eligible subject matter under section 101 of the Patent Act—process, machine, 
manufacture, and composition of matter--the first has proved the most difficult for courts to 
define.”). 
4
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 22, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol22/iss2/6
2015] SLIDE TO UNLOCK  415 
 
 
inventors, attorneys, and judges.  As touchscreen software continues to surge in 
popularity, the confusion is only likely to grow.26  Therefore, this Note aims to 
clarify many of these issues, and proposes a simple test for evaluating process 
claims under Section 101 in the touchscreen software context.  
Part II of this Note describes the legal landscape for the “Slide-to-Unlock” 
patent, including a summary of the Court’s patentable subject matter 
jurisprudence.  More specifically, this Part details the patentable subject matter 
requirement set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006), including the relevant case law, 
while then addressing the Alice decision.  This Part then summarizes the 
litigation regarding the “Slide-to-Unlock” patent and details its history.  Next, 
Part III of this Note uses the framework established by the Supreme Court in 
Alice and previous cases to analyze the “Slide-to-Unlock” patent under Section 
101, concluding that it should have been invalidated as ineligible subject matter.  
Finally, this Note argues for the adoption of a more workable standard for 
touchscreen software patents under Section 101—namely a “stripping away” 
method—that simplifies the current analytical scheme while remaining 
consistent with the Court’s precedent.  
II.  BACKGROUND 
The Constitution provides that Congress shall have the power “to promote 
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”27  This clause grants Congress the power to regulate patents in the 
United States.  Accordingly, Congress has enacted a number of limitations on 
the eligibility of an invention for patent protection.  First, Section 101 of the 
Patent Act describes what subject matter is eligible for patent protection: 
“[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement 
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and 
requirements of this title.”28  This seemingly straightforward section of the 
                                                                                                                   
 26 See generally Steven Musil, Apple’s Touch-screen Patent Upheld by U.S. Patent Office, http:// 
www.cnet.com/news/apples-touch-screen-patent-upheld-by-us-patent-office/ (last visited Nov. 11, 
2014) (the “Steve Jobs Patent” held by Apple covering a touchscreen patent was affirmed upon 
reexamination by the Patent office—potentially affecting litigation with Samsung and Google).  The 
broader “Slide-to-Unlock” patent (U.S. Patent No. 8,286,103), supra note 8, also demonstrates this 
growing confusion. 
 27 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  
 28 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).  
5
McKinley: Slide to Unlock: Apple-Samsung, Alice, and the Need for Clarity i
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 2015
416 J. INTELL. PROP. L.  [Vol. 22:411 
 
 
Patent Act has drawn an increasing amount of attention in recent years.29  In 
addition, an invention must be new,30 nonobvious31 and meet certain formalities 
to receive patent protection.32  Courts have clarified that the eligibility 
determination is separate and distinct from the latter requirements of 
patentability.33   
A.  HISTORY OF SECTION 101 AND THE PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER 
REQUIREMENT  
With respect to the patentable subject matter requirement, the Court has 
“held that [§ 101] contains an important implicit exception: Laws of nature, 
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.”34  Case law 
demonstrates that applying this general exception is often a difficult task.  For 
example, the Supreme Court has had to determine whether industrial processes 
for curing rubber,35 business methods for hedging risk,36 processes for 
administering pharmaceuticals,37 and DNA segments38 constitute patentable 
subject matter under § 101.  
In Diamond v. Diehr, the Court found that the claimed method—a computer-
monitored process for properly curing raw, synthetic rubber—satisfied the 
subject matter requirement.39  The Court noted that several steps of the process 
involved a mathematical equation—in itself not patentable—but reasoned that 
the patent did not seek to protect the equation, rather it sought to patent the 
process for curing rubber.40  In reaching its conclusion, the Court contrasted 
the patent at issue in Diehr with a patent in an earlier case.  Parker v. Flook.41  In 
                                                                                                                   
 29 In the last five years alone, the Supreme Court has ruled on Section 101 four times.  See 
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 
132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012); Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 
(2013); Alice Corp. Pty Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).  These cases are detailed in 
the ensuing section.  
 30 See id. § 102. 
 31 See id. § 103. 
 32 See id. § 112. 
 33 See Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1304 (rejecting the Government’s argument for 
conflating § 101 with §§ 102, 103, and 112); see generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 102–103, 112. 
 34 Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1293 (internal quotations omitted).  
 35 See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).  
 36 See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010).  
 37 See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012). 
 38 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).  
 39 Diamond, 450 U.S. at 184.  
 40 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187.  
 41 98 S. Ct. 2522 (1978). 
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Flook, the patent claimed a method for determining “alarm limits” based off a 
number of other known variables,42 which the Court invalidated because the 
patent attempted to protect the mathematical formula, rather than any 
process.43  
Between the court’s decision in Diehr in 1981 and 2010, the lower courts 
assessed patentable subject matter using the so-called machine-or-
transformation test.44  The MOT test states that “an applicant may show that a 
process claim satisfies § 101 either by showing that his claim is tied to a 
particular machine, or by showing that his claim transforms an article.”45  The 
MOT test helped simplify the difficulties of § 101 analysis, but its usefulness in 
modern cases is somewhat limited.46   
In Bilski v. Kappos, the Court held the claimed method for hedging risk in the 
energy market constituted a mathematical formula and was thus ineligible 
subject matter.47  Importantly, the court rejected the MOT test as the sole test 
for determining patent eligible subject matter.48  As the Court stated, “[t]he 
concept of hedging, described in claim 1 and reduced to a mathematical 
formula in claim 4, is an unpatentable abstract idea . . . . Allowing petitioners to 
patent risk hedging would pre-empt use of this approach in all fields, and would 
effectively grant a monopoly over an abstract idea.”49  Though the Court rejects 
the patent as abstract, many commentators have its criticized decision for failing 
to set forth clear standards of what constitutes an abstract idea, and what makes 
                                                                                                                   
 42 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 186; see also Flook, 98 S. Ct. 2522. 
 43 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 186. 
 44 See, e.g., In re Ferguson, 558 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (rejecting an alternative test “in light 
of [the Federal Circuit’s] clear statements that the ‘sole,’ ‘definitive,’ ‘applicable,’ ‘governing,’ and 
proper test is the Supreme Court’s machine-or-transformation test”). 
 45 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 46 See Jeremy D. Roux, The Supreme Court and Section 101 Jurisprudence: Reconciling Subject-Matter 
Patentability Standards and the Abstract Idea Exception, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 629, 659 n.286 
(“Historically, the test was useful when dealing with physical machinery.  Nowadays, when the 
machinery is a personal computer running all kinds of software, the distinction is not so clear.”).  
 47 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 603–04 (2010).  
 48 The Court described the machine-or-transformation test as a “useful and important clue, an 
investigative tool, for determining whether some claimed inventions are processes under § 101,” 
but no more.  Id. at 604.  For more on the argument rejecting the machine-or-transformation test 
as the sole test for patentable subject matter, see Patent-Eligible Subject Matter,  supra note 25, at 376 
(“The Court was right to reject an exclusive MOT test--not only because text and precedent do 
not support an exclusive test, but also because whether a given invention is tied to a machine or 
transforms a physical article does not necessarily correspond to whether patent protection for 
that invention would further the constitutional goal of promoting progress.”). 
 49 Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611–12. 
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for a patentable invention.50  The Court was careful, however, to note that not 
all business method patents are unpatentable abstract ideas.51 
Confusion surrounding the abstract idea principle continued, leading to the 
Court’s decision in Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs, Inc.  In Mayo, the 
claimed patent involved methods for determining the proper dosage of 
pharmaceutical drugs to patients.52  The relevant claims described a three step 
process: (1) an “administering” step—doctors administer the drug to patients; 
(2), a “determining” step—doctors measure the resulting metabolite levels in 
the patient’s blood; and (3), a “wherein” step—directing the doctor to alter the 
patent’s dosage if the result of step (2) is outside predetermined thresholds.53  In 
finding this process an unpatentable abstract idea, the Court held, “to transform 
an unpatentable law of nature into a patent-eligible application of such a law, one 
must do more than simply state the law of nature while adding the words ‘apply 
it.’ ”54 Instead, in order to elevate an abstract idea into a patentable invention, 
there must be some “ ‘inventive concept,’ sufficient to ensure that the patent in 
practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the natural law 
itself.”55  Again, the Court was criticized for doing little to clarify the abstract 
idea principle.56  The lingering confusion surrounding patentable subject matter 
post-Mayo led one commenter to go so far as to call for the abolishment of 
§ 101 altogether.57 
Despite such criticism, the Court continued to explore the meaning of 
“inventive concept” in Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.  
Myriad Genetics owned a number of patents covering isolated sections of DNA 
containing gene sequences used to determine a particular individual’s risk of 
developing breast and ovarian cancer.58  As part of discovering these sequences, 
Myriad isolated the specific DNA segments containing these genes.59  The case 
                                                                                                                   
 50 See Roux, supra note 46, at 631 (“Unfortunately, the opinion is somewhat unclear and 
describes a test for abstract ideas somewhat abstractly. . . .  Although the judges agreed on the 
outcome, any semblance of a coherent test for abstract ideas was lacking.”). 
 51 Bilski, 561 U.S. at 612–13. 
 52 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1290 (2012).  
 53 Id. at 1294. 
 54 Id. (internal citations and quotations marks omitted). 
 55 Id. at 1294 (citing Flook, 98 S. Ct. 2522). 
 56 See Roux, supra note 46, at 650 (“Mayo created a kind of pessimistic uncertainty in the patent 
realm that cast serious doubt on what exactly was patentable.”). 
 57 See Denise DeFranco, Mayo: A Force to be Reckoned With, LANDSLIDE (July–August 2012), 
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/landslide/landslide_aug 
ust_2012/defranco_landslide_julyaugust_2012.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2015) 
(“We could solve all these problems if we get rid of § 101 altogether.”). 
 58 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2112–13 (2013).  
 59 Id. at 2113. 
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thus centered on whether this was a sufficient “inventive” step to warrant 
patent protection.60  The Federal Circuit ruled that it did.61  The Supreme Court 
reversed: “Myriad did not create anything.  To be sure, it found an important 
and useful gene, but separating that gene from its surrounding genetic material 
is not an act of invention.”62 
Despite this fairly extensive case law on § 101’s patentable subject matter 
requirements, confusion persisted on how to distinguish patent eligible subject 
matter from the ineligible.  Interestingly, the Court has never defined what 
constitutes an abstract idea, leaving others to determine from precedent where 
such a line may be drawn.63  In its most recent attempt to clarify this confusion, 
the Supreme Court decided Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank.64  
B.  ALICE CORP. V. CLS BANK  
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank involved a patent claiming a computer-implemented 
scheme for mitigating “settlement risk”—i.e., the risk that only one party to a 
transaction will satisfy its obligation to pay.65  The challenged patent claimed 
that its method uses a computer to create “shadow” credit and debit records—
described by the Court as “account ledgers”—to mirror the parties’ real-world 
bank balances.66  Using the real time account balances, the computer program 
then instructs banks as to whether transactions will be permitted.67 
In 2007, CLS Bank sought declaratory judgment that Alice Corp.’s patent 
was invalid.68  After Bilski, both parties sought summary judgment on the issue 
of patentable subject matter under § 101.69  The District Court found the patent 
invalid as an abstract idea.70  The Federal Circuit first reversed, before rehearing 
the case en banc.  A sharply divided Federal Circuit then affirmed the district 
court, finding that the patent’s claims “draw on the abstract idea of reducing 
                                                                                                                   
 60 Id. at 2114.  
 61 Id. at 2115. 
 62 Id. at 2117 (noting that the Court distinguished this process from Myriad’s process of 
creating cDNA, which it did hold patent-eligible).  
 63 See, e.g., DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 
(examining Supreme Court precedent for guiding principles in the abstract idea inquiry). 
 64 134 S. Ct. 2347. 
 65 Id. at 2352. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. at 2353.  
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
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settlement risk by effecting trades through a third-party intermediary.”71  Four 
judges dissented in part, arguing that the patent is eligible because it involves 
computer hardware “aimed at solving a complex problem.”72 
 The Supreme Court ultimately agreed with the district court and the 
plurality of the Federal Circuit, finding the patent ineligible as an abstract idea.73  
Citing Mayo, the Court delineated a framework for determining whether an 
abstract idea is patentable.74  If the Court determines that a patent’s claim is in 
fact an abstract idea, it asks, “what else is there in the claims before us?”75  The 
Court describes this question as searching for the claim’s “inventive concept.”76 
After reviewing much of the precedent detailed above the Court again 
concluded that the method claimed in the contested patent represented an 
abstract idea, while declining to define the precise contours of this inquiry.77  
Notably, however, the Court rejects that abstract ideas are confined to 
“preexisting fundamental truths that exist in principle apart from any action.”78 
Secondly, the Court again reviewed case law and found that Alice’s patent 
lacked the necessary inventive concept for protection.79  The analysis here was 
slightly more helpful than its analysis as to the first inquiry.  First, the Court 
reiterated that transformation of an abstract idea “requires more than simply 
stating the abstract idea while adding the words, ‘apply it.’ ”80  The Court also 
suggested the eligibility inquiry overlaps with a novelty inquiry81—reasoning 
that a method that is well known in the art and adding the application step is 
invalid.82  Moreover, adding a computer to this process is not a “patentable 
application of that principle.”83  A computer-implemented abstract idea obtains 
patent eligibility under § 101 when it “improves a[ ] . . . process, not because [it] 
implement[s] them on a computer.”84  In summary, “cases demonstrate that the 
                                                                                                                   
 71 Id.  
 72 Id.  
 73 Id. at 2352. 
 74 Id. at 2355.  
 75 Id. 
 76 Id.  
 77 Id. at 2357. 
 78 Id. at 2356.  For more on the argument that in the context of software patents, all software 
represents a preexisting fundamental truth, see generally Timothy B. Lee, Software is Just Math 
Really, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/sites/timothylee/2011/08/11/software-is-just-math-rea 
lly/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2014).  
 79 Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2357.  
 80 Id. (citing Mayo, 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294). 
 81 35 U.S.C. § 102. 
 82 Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2357. 
 83 Id.   
 84 Id.  
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mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible 
abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.”85  
As it stands, Alice represents the most current ruling on the patent eligible 
subject matter and the abstract idea exception.  It is not clear that Alice actually 
provided much new insight into the § 101 requirements, nevertheless the 
United States Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO) and future Courts will have 
to rely on the opinion, as well as other precedent discussed above, in analyzing 
future patents.86  
C.  A BRIEF BACKGROUND OF THE APPLE V. SAMSUNG LITIGATION 
With a background into the Court’s subject matter jurisprudence, this Note 
will now turn its attention to arguably the highest profile patent litigation in the 
modern era—Apple v. Samsung.87  The two tech giants88 have been duking it out 
in courtroom for the last several years.89  The first of two lawsuits filed by 
Apple resulted in a jury verdict totaling over $1 billion.90  That suit involved a 
number of patents outside the scope of this Note—namely design patents 
regarding the shape of the phone and a patent regarding the two-finger zoom 
mechanism employed by the iPhone.91 
In 2012, Apple filed another infringement suit, this time alleging 
infringement of eight of Apple’s patents.92  Among the alleged infringed patents 
was U.S. Patent No. 8,046,721 (the ’721 patent), titled “Unlocking a Device by 
Performing Gestures on an Unlock Image.”93  The ’721 patent describes a 
portable electronic device with a touchscreen interface that a user can unlock by 
                                                                                                                   
 85 Id. at 2358. 
 86 See Memorandum: Preliminary Examination Instructions in view of the Supreme Court Decision in Alice 
Corporation Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, et al., Andrew H. Hirschfield, Deputy Commissioner 
for Patent Examination Policy, June 25, 2014, available at http://www.uspto.gov/patents/announ 
ce/alice_pec_25jun2014.pdf [hereinafter Memorandum] (“Despite these changes, the basic inquiries 
to determine subject matter eligibility remain the same.”). 
 87 877 F. Supp. 2d 838 (N.D. 2012). 
 88 Both companies rank in the top twenty-five largest public companies in the world.  The 
World’s Biggest Public Companies, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/global2000/list/ (last visited 
Nov. 10, 2014).  
 89 See Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., 920 F. Supp. 2d 1079 (N.D. Cal. 2013); see also 
Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., 877 F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Cal. 2013). 
 90 Apple, Inc. v. Samsung, Elec. Co., 2011 WL 7036077 (N.D. Cal. 2011); see also Wingfield, 
supra note 14.  
 91 Id. 
 92 See Amended Complaint, supra note 15, at 12.   
 93 See The ’721 Patent, supra note 8. 
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sliding an image across the screen in a “predefined gesture.”94  Specifically, the 
patent describes a method of unlocking a touchscreen device by continuously 
moving a graphical image, following a user’s touch, from a locked position to an 
unlocked one, thus unlocking the device.95  The described technology is familiar 
to anyone acquainted with one of Apple’s touchscreen devices—the “Slide-to-
Unlock” screen.  The “Slide-to-Unlock” screen features an arrow pointing to 
the right and the text “Slide to Unlock.”96  When a user slides the block to the 
boundary, the phone unlocks.97   
The Slide-to-Unlock patent has generated significant controversy among 
interested parties.98  Several commentators have argued that the ’721 patent was 
not invented by Apple,99 that it did not meet the novelty requirement of Section 
102 of the Patent Act,100 or that it is simply ridiculous.101  Nonetheless, the 
USPTO granted Apple the patent and Apple has vigorously asserted its 
monopoly over the Slide-to-Unlock method.102  
Samsung implemented a similar feature in its phones, including a “swiping” 
motion from left to right to unlock the device.103  After several years of 
litigation and trial, a jury ultimately found that Samsung violated the ’721 patent, 
as well as Apple’s patent regarding its universal search function.104  Samsung 
                                                                                                                   
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Apple Awarded design patents for Slide to Unlock and original iPhone design, APPLE INSIDER, http:// 
appleinsider.com/articles/13/02/05/apple-awarded-design-patents-for-slide-to-unlock-and-origi 
nal-iphone-design (last visited Oct. 15, 2014). 
 97 The ’721 Patent, supra note 8. 
 98 See 10 European judges found Apple had not invented slide-to-unlock (star patent at Samsung trial), FOSS 
PATENTS, http://www.fosspatents.com/2014/04/10-european-judges-found-apple-had-not.html 
(last visited Oct. 27, 2014) (“The litigation track record of this patent . .  has over the years 
changed my perspective on Apple’s android lawsuit from ‘Bullish’ to ‘Bearish.’ ”). 
 99 See id. (“Apple is suing Samsung in California over ‘slide-to-unlock,’ but a little-known 
Swedish Touchscreen Phone . . . already had that feature.”). 
 100 See Researcher’s 1991 Video Could Torpedo Apple’s Key ‘Slide to Unlock’ Patent, GEEKWIRE, http:// 
www.geekwire.com/2014/microsoft-researchers-1991-video-torpedo-one-apples-patents/ (last 
visited Oct. 27, 2014) (“The video, which pre-dates Apple’s Patent by more than a decade, could 
serve as prior art that shows the patent is invalid.”). 
 101 See Henry Blodget, Apple Sues Samsung For ‘Slide-To-Unlock’ And Other Ludicrous iPhone Patent 
Violations, BUS. INSIDER, http://www.businessinsider.com/apple-sues-samsumg-for-slide-to-unlo 
ck-2012-2#ixzz3HMHGjNn4 (last visited May 1, 20154) (“Apple, however, appears to try Patent 
[sic] every tiny little feature it thinks up.”).  
 102 Apple has pursued “Slide-to-Unlock” litigation against competitors and across the globe.  See 
Apple’s Slide-to-Unlock Victory over Motorola, DIGITAL TRENDS, http://www.digitaltrends.com/mobi 
le/apples-slide-to-unlock-victory-over-motorola/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2015). 
 103 See Lock Screen Features, SAMSUNG, http://www.samsung.com/us/support/howtoguide/N00 
00006/10632/127767 (last visited Oct. 15, 2014). 
 104 877 F. Supp. 2d 838; see also U.S. jury orders Samsung to pay Apple $120 Million, supra note 20. 
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unsuccessfully contested the validity of Apple’s patents and § 102, § 103, and 
§ 112 grounds.105  In the end, Samsung’s infringement of Apple’s two patents 
led to a damages award to Apple of $119.6 million. 
A few months after the Court announced the verdict in Apple’s favor, the 
Court delivered its ruling in Alice.  In what amounted to a last ditch effort to 
invalidate the contested patents, Samsung filed a motion for judgment as a 
matter of law in light of the Court’s ruling.106  
Interestingly, Samsung’s motion marked its first attempt to invalidate the 
patent as ineligible subject matter under § 101.107  Nonetheless, Samsung argued 
that after Alice, Apple’s ’721 patent is merely “directed to the abstract idea of 
locking and unlocking a device.”108  Reiterating the Court’s jurisprudence in 
Alice, as well as other precedent, and prior cases, Samsung argued that “[s]imply 
using a computer to implement the abstract idea of moving a lock from locked 
to unlocked position does not render the idea patentable.”109 
Apple’s reply primarily contended that Samsung waived any § 101 defense 
by not bringing it up before trial.110  Nonetheless, Apple rebuffed Samsung’s 
arguments, asserting that the contested claims of the ’721 patent are “not drawn 
solely to an abstract idea, and also contain[ ] an ‘inventive’ concept apart from 
any supposed abstract idea.”111  Apple further asserts that locking and unlocking 
a device is not an abstract idea, excluded from § 101, like a “fundamental 
economic practice” or a “mathematical algorithm”—the types of abstract ideas 
that Court has previously struck down in Alice or Flook, for example.112  Even if 
it were such an abstract idea, it contains the necessary “inventive concept” for 
protection.113 
In the end, these arguments were mooted as the Northern District of 
California denied Samsung’s motion.114  Without addressing the parties’ 
                                                                                                                   
 105 See Order Denying Samsung’s Motion, supra note 17, at 3. 
 106 Supreme Court’s New Rules on Abstract Patents hit Apple v. Samsung, ARS TECHNICA, http://arste 
chnica.com/tech-policy/2014/07/supreme-courts-new-rules-on-abstract-patents-hit-apple-v-sam 
sung/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2014). 
 107 Id. 
 108 Supplemental Brief in Support of Samsung’s Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law in 
View of Alice v. CLS Bank Decision at 2, Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elec. Co., 877 F. Supp. 2d 838 
(N.D. Cal. 2012).   
 109 Id. at 4. 
 110 Apple’s Opposition to Samsung’s Request for Leave For Supplemental Briefing at 1, Apple, 
Inc. v. Samsung Elec. Co., Ltd., 877 F. Supp. 2d 838 (N.D. Cal. 2012) [hereinafter Apple’s 
Opposition to Samsung’s Request].   
 111 Id. at 9–10.  
 112 Id. at 10.  
 113 Id. 
 114 Order Denying Samsung’s Motion, supra note 17, at 2.   
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arguments, the Court agreed that Samsung had waived any of its § 101 defenses 
by not raising them at an earlier stage in the litigation.115   
Because the merits of a § 101 argument were never heard—either pre- or 
post-Alice—debate remains as to how the argument would have been resolved.  
The next section of this Note aims to do just that, as well as provide clarity for 
touchscreen software patents in the future by proposing a test for patent subject 
matter eligibility.  
III.  ANALYSIS 
As the Court stated in both Mayo and Alice, any inquiry into a patent’s 
eligibility under Section 101 is two-fold: first, the Court must “determine 
whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those patent ineligible 
concepts [i.e., an abstract idea]”;116 second, the Court “ask[s], what else is there 
in the claim before us?”117  To answer the latter, the Court “consider[s] the 
element of each claim both individually and ‘as an ordered combination’ to 
determine whether the additional elements ‘transform the nature of the claim’ 
into a patent eligible application.”118  Step two of this analysis is described as “a 
search for an ‘ “inventive concept.” ’ ”119 
The inquiry here follows the same framework.  Part III.A will show that the 
’721 patent refers to an abstract idea.  Part III.B demonstrates that the ’721 
parent lacks an inventive concept.  Finally Part III.C proposes an alternative test 
for software patent validity that simplifies the two-part inquiry. 
A.  THE METHOD CLAIMED IN THE ’721 PATENT REPRESENTS AN ABSTRACT 
IDEA 
Step one—determining whether an abstract idea is printed in a claim—is 
perhaps the most difficult step in the analysis, particularly for lower courts and 
patent examiners.  This difficulty is due to the unfortunate fact that the 
Supreme Court has never established an authoritative test for determining what 
constitutes a patent ineligible abstract idea.120  In the cases described in Part II 
                                                                                                                   
 115 Id. 
 116 Alice Corp. Pty Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014) (citing Mayo 
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293–97).  
 117 Id. (citing Mayo, 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1297). 
 118 Id. (citing Mayo, 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1297–98). 
 119 Id. (citing Mayo, 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294). 
 120 See Memorandum, supra note 86 (listing areas where the Court has found patents to cover 
ineligible abstract ideas, but refusing to draw bright-line rules or guidelines for determining an 
abstract idea).  
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above, the Court has found an ineligible abstract idea in a process for curing 
rubber,121 a process for hedging risk,122 and recently, a computerized method 
for mitigating settlement risk.123  Thus, this Note sifts through the Court’s 
rulings on the matter to attempt to determine what constitutes an ineligible 
abstract idea.  The USPTO’s instructions in response to Alice, however, noted 
that abstract ideas include, “fundamental economic practices, certain methods 
of organizing human activities, an idea of itself, and mathematical 
relationships/formulas.”124 
Attempting to create a clear definition from these examples is certainly not 
an easy task, perhaps hinting at why the Court has never offered one.  In fact, 
the Court expressly decline to do so in Alice Corp., stating that “[i]n any event, 
we need not labor to delimit the precise contours of the ‘abstract ideas’ 
category.”125  Nonetheless, some principles and comparisons can be drawn.  
First, the ’721 patent describes a method for unlocking a locked touchscreen 
device.126  The background section of the patent acknowledges a perceived 
problem with such devices, noting that “portable devices, touch screens on 
such devices, and/or applications running on such devices may be locked upon 
satisfaction of predefined lock conditions, such as upon entering an active call, 
after a predetermined time of idleness has elapsed, or upon manual locking by a 
user.”127  The question still remains, however, whether locking and unlocking a 
device constitutes an abstract idea. 
Apple argued that its ’721 patent does not cover a “fundamental economic 
concept” or a “mathematical algorithm.”128  Presumably, Apple’s reference to a 
“fundamental economic concept” or “mathematical algorithm” seeks to 
distinguish its “Slide-to-Unlock” software from the method for hedging present 
in Bilski129 and the computerized method for mitigating risk described in 
Alice.130  Such a comparison is unpersuasive.  Quite clearly, Apple’s patent 
doesn’t regard anything related to such an economic concept.  Citing discrete 
and unrelated examples of where the Court has found unpatentable subject 
matter does little to create a principle to determine whether the ’721 patent 
meets the requirements of Section 101.  
                                                                                                                   
 121 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).  
 122 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010). 
 123 Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. 2347. 
 124 Memorandum, supra note 86. 
 125 Alice Corp., 132 S. Ct. at 2357. 
 126 See The ’721 Patent, supra note 8.  
 127 Id.  
 128 Apple’s Opposition to Samsung’s Request, supra note 110, at 10.  
 129 See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010). 
 130 See Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. 2347. 
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Even less convincing, however, is Apple’s argument that its ’721 Patent is 
not comparable to a “mathematical algorithm.”  To an extent, every piece of 
software is a series of mathematical operations.131  This fact makes analyzing the 
patent eligibility of any piece of software difficult.  Nonetheless, there exists no 
bright-line rule prohibiting software patents.132  For this reason, software 
patents, such as Apple’s Slide-to-Unlock patent, should undergo closer scrutiny 
than more traditional patents.  Software must always be claimed as a “useful 
process” under Section 101—it is not a “machine, manufacture, or composition 
of matter.”133  Thus, any software patent is going to raise Section 101 issues 
similar to those discussed in detail in Part II.  A process necessarily will border 
upon an abstract idea.  Clearly, however, Apple’s patent should not be 
invalidated merely because it regards a piece of software, which necessarily acts 
as a series of mathematical operations.134 
The primary concern behind prohibiting a patent on an abstract idea is “one 
of pre-emption.”135  As the Court described, patenting an abstract idea “would 
pre-empt use of this approach in all fields, and would effectively grant a 
monopoly over an abstract idea.”136  Accordingly, the analysis needs to 
determine whether the ’721 patent covers one of the “building blocks of human 
ingenuity” that would prohibit others from the use of the abstract idea of 
unlocking a touchscreen phone.137 
As Apple acknowledges in the ’721 patent, touchscreen smartphones 
encounter the problem of unintended contact causing the phone to perform 
unwanted operations, such as opening an application or accidentally dialing a 
phone call.138  Similar problems face all touchscreen devices—and even many 
modern devices with traditional input interfaces such as a keyboard or mouse.  
Thus, nearly all portable devices include a lock and unlock method so that users 
can easily control their devices.  For touchscreen devices, the “sliding” or 
“swiping” method has become commonplace.  
Ultimately, because Apple’s ’721 patent covers a method for solving a 
commonplace problem for smartphones, implemented through software that 
                                                                                                                   
 131 See Lee, supra note 78 (“A computer program is a sequence of symbols that a hardware 
device interprets as the steps of a mathematical algorithm.” (emphasis added)). 
 132 See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981) (patent for software used during the process 
for curing rubber); see also Bilski, 561 U.S. at 605 (“But this fact does not mean that unforeseen 
innovations such as computer programs are always unpatentable.”). 
 133 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 134 See Lee, supra note 78.  
 135 Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2354. 
 136 Id. (quoting Bilski). 
 137 Id. (citing Mayo). 
 138 See The ’721 Patent, supra note 8. 
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can operate on any modern device, the “Slide-to-Unlock” patent is an abstract 
idea.  Simple processes that can be implemented on generic computers have 
found it difficult to obtain protection under the abstract idea doctrine.139  
Accordingly, the Section 101 analysis of the “Slide-to-Unlock” patent must 
continue to the second part of the Court’s framework: whether the patent 
contains a sufficiently “inventive concept.” 
B.  THE “SLIDE-TO-UNLOCK” PATENT DOES NOT CONTAIN A SUFFICIENTLY 
“INVENTIVE CONCEPT” TO WARRANT PATENT ELIGIBILITY UNDER SECTION 
101 
Until recently, the primary test for assessing patent eligibility under Section 
101 was the machine-or-transformation (MOT) test.140  The MOT test stated 
that “an applicant may show that a process claim satisfies [Section] 101 either 
by showing that his claim is tied to a particular machine, or by showing that his 
claim transforms an article.”141  
Under this test, Apple’s patent would be unlikely to survive.  First, the 
“Slide-to-Unlock” mechanism is not tied to any particular machine.  The patent 
refers to a “device with a touch-sensitive display” that can be unlocked by a 
predefined gesture.142 A generic touch-screen device does not constitute a 
“particular machine” as the Federal Circuit has interpreted it.  As to the 
transformation prong of the analysis, “[a] claimed process is patent-eligible if it 
transforms an article into a different state or thing.  This transformation must 
be central to the purpose of the claimed process.”143  One view might argue that 
the ’721 patent does transform the device in question—from a “locked” state to 
an “unlocked state.”  However, the test has further been articulated to “involve 
the transformation of any physical object or substance, or an electronic signal 
                                                                                                                   
 139 See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978) (holding that use of a generic computer to 
calculate alarm limits was not patentable).  Compare Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (holding that 
a patent covering using a computer to consistently monitor and calculate an alarm limit, then stop 
the rubber curing process was covered).  One key distinction between the two patents is the Diehr 
patent incorporated a computer into its process, while the patent in Flook used a generic 
computer to calculate alarm limits—in essence, it amounted to a patent on the equation itself.  See 
also Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2358 (“[G]iven the ubiquity of computers, wholly generic computer 
implementation is not generally the sort of additional feature that provides any practical assurance 
that the process is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the abstract idea itself.” 
(internal quotations and citations omitted)). 
 140 See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 604–04 (2010) (rejecting the machine-or-transformation 
test as the sole test for determining Section 101 eligibility). 
 141 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 961 (Fed. Cir. 2008).  
 142 The ’721 Patent, supra note 8. 
 143 In re Bilski, 543 F.3d at 962. 
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representative of any physical object or substance.”144  With that in mind, the 
“Slide-to-Unlock” method does not transform any physical object or substance.  
Furthermore, it does not involve an electrical signal representative of a physical 
object or substance.  The method merely describes a method for unlocking a 
locked touchscreen device.  Accordingly, Apple’s patent would not survive the 
MOT test.  
However, the Court in Bilski ruled that the MOT test was merely a “useful 
and important clue, an investigative tool, for determining whether some claimed 
inventions are processes under [Section] 101,” but no more.145   
Post-Bilski, the Court additionally considers whether the application 
contains a sufficient “inventive concept.”146  “To answer that question [the 
Court] consider[s] the elements of each claim both individually and ‘as an 
ordered combination’ to determine whether the additional elements ‘transform 
the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.”147  Apple describes 
the Slide-to-Unlock method as a four step implementation:  
(1) to detect contact with the touch-sensitive display at a first 
predefined location corresponding to an unlock image; (2) to 
continuously move the unlock image on the touch-sensitive 
display in accordance with movement of the detected contact; (3) 
to unlock the hand-held electronic device if the unlock image is 
moved from the first predefined location on the touch screen to a 
predefined unlock region on the touch-sensitive display; and (4) 
visual cues to communicate a direction of movement of the 
unlock image required to unlock the device.148 
According to Apple, “these steps are not routine steps common to all computer 
systems.”149  Despite Apple’s seemingly complex technical language, these 
arguments are unconvincing.  While “all computer systems” may not rely on the 
described mechanism, such methods are common in the touchscreen context, 
as described supra.  The first step in the process is simply detecting the touch of 
a user.  If a touchscreen could not detect a user’s touch, it would serve no 
purpose.  The same can be said for the second step.  In essence, continuous 
movement of the unlock image is analogous to the “drag and drop” method 
                                                                                                                   
 144 Id. at 964.  
 145 561 U.S. at 604. 
 146 Alice Corp. Pty Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (quoting Mayo). 
 147 Id. at 2355.  
 148 Apple’s Opposition to Samsung’s Request, supra note 110, at 10.  
 149 Id.  
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commonplace to computer operating systems long before the “Slide-to-
Unlock” patent was claimed.150  Steps three and four are also easily debunked as 
not containing an inventive concept.  Step three describes the basic operation 
of “Slide-to-Unlock,” but, essentially states that the device unlocks when the 
image is moved to a “predefined unlock region.”  Again, this feature is 
analogous to the “drop” portion of the “Drag and Drop” process.151  Finally, 
step four provides “visual cues to communicate a direction of movement,” a 
circuitous way of explaining that the touchscreen will show the movement as it 
occurs.  It is universally common among computers to provide visual feedback 
to a user as he or she operates the machine—words show up on the screen as 
they are typed, applications open when they are selected, etc.  It is certainly a 
stretch to say that, even when viewed as an “ordered combination,”152 the four 
step process above amounts to an “inventive concept.”  
Such a result is consistent with the Court’s current jurisprudence on Section 
101.  Even before the ubiquity of touchscreen devices, the Court noted “that 
the prohibition against patenting abstract ideas cannot be circumvented by 
attempting to limit the use of the idea to a particular technological 
environment.”153  Patent eligible claims should invent or improve an existing 
process, not merely implement them on a computer.154  Quite simply, Apple has 
failed to do so with its “Slide-to-Unlock” method.  Accordingly, the patent 
should be invalidated under Section 101 for failing to constitute eligible subject 
matter.  
Though this Note argues that the “Slide-to-Unlock” patent should have 
been invalidated under Section 101 and the existing framework most recently 
described in Alice Corp., it recognizes the difficulties imposed on the Court in 
applying these tests—particularly as it relates to complex technological schemes 
and touchscreen software.  Thus, the next section proposes a more workable 
alternative for courts to apply.  
                                                                                                                   
 150 See Drag and Drop, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Drag_and_drop (last visited 
Oct. 27, 2014).  See generally Realview, LLC v. 20-20 Technologies, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 2d 147, 164 
(D. Mass. 2010) (“The ‘drag and drop’ procedure is a standard computing operation.”). 
 151 See id. 
 152 Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2355. 
 153 Id. at 2358 (quoting Bilski) (internal citations omitted). 
 154 Id. 
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C.  A WORKABLE JUDICIAL TEST TO ANALYZE SECTION 101 CLAIMS OF 
TOUCHSCREEN SOFTWARE PATENTS 
Despite the Court’s recent interest in patent cases,155 the Court has as yet 
failed to articulate a clear and workable test for determining whether a 
challenged patent meets Section 101’s subject matter requirements.  This is not 
to say that scholars and commenters have not attempted to do so for the Court, 
with one even going so far as to suggest the abandonment of Section 101 
altogether.156  
Abandoning Section 101 entirely sounds appealing when examining the 
difficulties Courts have endured in applying it.  One need only to read Part II of 
this Note to realize the inherent difficulties imposed by the patentable subject 
matter requirement.  Indeed, many patents invalidated under Section 101 may 
also be invalidated under other sections of the Patent Act.157  However, it is not 
clear that the other requirements for a patent—that it be new, useful, and 
nonobvious—would adequately reject the same patents typically rejected under 
Section 101.  Regardless, Section 101 is here to stay.  Thus, another solution 
must suffice. 
Due to the broad spectrum of scientific fields covered under patent law, a 
specific test may not be applicable to all claimed inventions.  Accordingly, the 
Court has rejected exclusive use of the MOT test in favor of the more flexible 
“inventive concept” approach.158  However, applying specific tests to certain 
fields of inventions—such as software patents is a more realistic goal.   
One way to view the Court’s Section 101 jurisprudence with regard to 
software patents is that the claimed method must survive Section 101 scrutiny 
when stripped of its software elements.  That is, the underlying method or 
process that the software instructs the computer to do must be patentable 
without considering the software itself.   
In the cases discussed in Part II above, this principle becomes apparent.  
Diamond v. Diehr in particular, evidences this view.159  There, the Court did not 
                                                                                                                   
 155 See Roux, supra note 46, at 630 (“Even as the Court’s docket has shrunk in recent years, the 
number of IP cases it hears is on the rise.”). 
 156 See DeFranco, supra note 57. 
 157 See id. (“Section 102 would work against laws of nature and natural phenomenon.  Section 
102 requires novelty.  Laws of nature and natural phenomenon are not new.  Section 112 would 
work against abstract ideas.  Section 112 requires that the invention be claimed in such a way that 
it is enabled and described to its full breadth.”). 
 158 See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 603–04 (2010) (rejecting the machine-or-transformation 
test as the sole test for determining patentable subject matter under Section 101); Alice Corp., 134 
S. Ct. 2347, 2355. 
 159 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
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conclude that the mathematical formula implemented by the software was 
patentable, but rather that the added step of utilizing the computer to calculate 
the exact time to stop the curing process transformed the abstract idea into 
eligible subject matter.160  In fairness, the patent in Diehr may not survive 
scrutiny of other patentability requirements—namely obviousness—in light of 
today’s technological innovations and the near ubiquity of computer monitoring 
in manufacturing systems.161  Nonetheless, the implementation of software to 
improve a curing process proved eligible under Section 101 where the patent 
did not seek to claim the software itself.162  
Similarly in Alice, the Court held the software patent claiming a method for 
mitigating settlement risk ineligible subject matter163 because “[t]he mere 
recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract 
idea into a patent-eligible invention.”164 
As these cases demonstrate, a software patent can survive Section 101 
scrutiny when, stripped of its strictly software components, the method itself 
would prove patentable.   
The touchscreen introduces a new element into the software analysis.  Most 
touchscreen software patents, like the ’721 patent, focus on the user interface to 
perform operations on the touchscreen device.  However, to analyze the 
touchscreen software under Section 101, this additional layer should be stripped 
away, leaving only the underlying method for analysis.   
The ’721 patent serves as an excellent example for how this principle would 
work.  The four step process165 Apple claims would not survive a Section 101 
analysis when its software elements, both the touchscreen and underlying 
software layers, are stripped away.  The first step, detecting the touch of the 
user,166 is a purely touchscreen element of the method.  Under this proposed 
test, it should accordingly be stripped away from the analysis.  The second step, 
continuous movement of the unlock image with the contact of the user,167 
similarly contains touchscreen software elements.  Moving an icon with the 
touch of the user is strictly related to touchscreen software, and thus should be 
stripped away for the purposes of analysis.  Predictably, Step three is more of 
                                                                                                                   
 160 Id. at 187.  
 161 See 35 U.S.C. § 103. 
 162 Compare Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978) (finding that software merely to 
calculate alarm limits did not meet Section 101 requirements).  See also supra note 139. 
 163 Alice Corp. Pty Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
 164 Id.   
 165 See Apple’s Opposition to Samsung’s Request, supra note 110, at 10.  Also described in detail 
on page 425, infra.   
 166 Apple’s Opposition to Samsung’s Request, supra note 110. 
 167 Id. 
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the same.  When stripped of its touchscreen elements, it describes the process 
of moving an object from one end to another, unlocking a device.168  The final 
step merely describes the images shown on the screen while these actions take 
place.  When stripped of all its software elements, the ’721 patent simply 
describes the process of moving an object from point A to point B to unlock 
something.  In other words, it amounts to nothing more than a basic switch.  
Surely, the basic switch is an idea so fundamental that it cannot constitute 
patentable subject matter under Section 101.   
Moreover, this “stripping away” approach simplifies the process of 
determining when a touchscreen software patent claims a law of nature, natural 
phenomena, or abstract idea.  Without the technical nature of touchscreen 
software obscuring the underlying process, the simple nature of the ’721 patent 
becomes exposed.  Despite coming to a similar conclusion of patent-ineligibility 
based on current Supreme Court precedent, the process was greatly simplified 
by using this “stripping away” approach.  In fact, that the results under these 
two different tests agree supports the argument that the proposed “stripping 
away” test is reconcilable with the Court’s Section 101 jurisprudence.  
In sum, the ’721 patent should have been deemed invalid in light of the 
Supreme Court’s Alice decision.  The method claim contained in the ’721 patent 
represents a patent ineligible abstract idea and lacks a sufficient inventive 
concept to elevate the claim to patent eligibility.  Nonetheless, the Court’s 
Section 101 jurisprudence creates uncertainty in this result.  Accordingly, this 
Note proposes a “stripping away” test for software method patents that would 
simplify this inquiry, while remaining consistent with the Court’s precedent. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The Court’s Section 101 jurisprudence, culminating with its decision in Alice, 
attempts to provide guidance on the determination of patent-eligible subject 
matter.  Although the court offers some useful principles, no clear, overarching 
standard exists for a Section 101 analysis.  The confusion surrounding Section 
101 opens the door for validity challenges to any number of patents, as 
demonstrated by the late challenge in the Apple—Samsung litigation.  Though 
Samsung missed its chance to argue for invalidity under Section 101,169 the 
“Slide-to-Unlock” patent would not have withstood Section 101 scrutiny under 
the Supreme Court’s current “inventive concept” approval as argued in Part III 
                                                                                                                   
 168 Id. 
 169 Order Denying Samsung’s Motion, supra note 17.  
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of this Note.  Nevertheless, the lack of clear principles leaves lingering 
uncertainty in that result. 
The need for clarity in Section 101 eligibility standards for software patents 
will only heighten as touchscreen technology increases in ubiquity and 
complexity.170  The Court’s failure to provide adequate guidance hinders the 
“promotion of the sciences as useful arts,”171 as the Patent Act purports to do.  
Inventors are left confused as to whether their inventions can be patented.  
Moreover, they face the daunting prospect of drawn out and expensive patent 
prosecution, as well as validity challenges.  Already facing the uphill battle of 
understanding complex technical matters involved in patent disputes, lower 
courts additionally bear the burden of struggling with the confusing Section 101 
jurisprudence.  The lack of a clear standard raises the possibility of inconsistent 
results in different courtrooms. 
In light of these concerns demonstrating a pressing need for a clear, easy to 
apply standard, this Note proposes a “stripping away” method.  Removing the 
touchscreen and software elements from the claimed method or process eases 
the technical burden of the trial judge, and provides clearer notice to the 
inventor of what is and is not patentable under Section 101.  As disputes over 
software patents continue to arise in courts the problems demonstrated in this 
Note will only persist.  Adoption of the proposed test will help to ease that 
burden. 
                                                                                                                   
 170 Fifty-eight percent of American adults use smartphones, which nearly all include 
touchscreens.  See Cell Phone and Smartphone Ownership Demographics, supra note 2; see also Smartphones, 
VERIZON WIRELESS, supra note 3.  This number should be expected to rise, and even so, already 
fails to account for touchscreen tablet devices and home computers.   
 171  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.   
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